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Abstract
Concepts and principles of Islamic finance, which respect the beliefs and practices of the Muslim
faith, are becoming more prevalent in the United Kingdom (UK). The concept of Takaful (Islamic
insurance), while still in its infancy in the UK, is proving a viable alternative to traditional insurance
models. This paper argues that increased efforts should be made by UK financial services
regulators to develop suitable corporate governance standards and enhance Takaful awareness.
Such efforts will ultimately increase domestic insurance penetration by providing Muslims with
a compliant system of insurance, and, further, allow the UK to emerge as a viable and global
Takaful market.
The comparative study between English common law and Islamic law in this paper illustrates,
inter alia, the differences between risk (measurable uncertainty) and uncertainty (pure risk, namely
an immeasurable form of hazard), with the goal of finding a uniform standard for the incorporation
of the concept of risk management into English insurance contracts. Fundamentally, the difference
between risk and uncertainty is derived from the understanding of Professor Frank Knight.
Ultimately, the differences in the ideologies of risk-taking in Western countries and risk-sharing in
Islamic countries, specifically in relation to the insurance industry, do not constitute a challenge,
but instead, the basis for possible common ground upon which to build a mutual system of
cooperation between different legal traditions.
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1. Introduction
The concept of Takaful (Islamic insurance) is still in its infancy in the UK, although it is considered a
potential new market with high prospects for profitability. This comparative study aims to illustrate the
Takaful concept under Islamic (hereinafter referred to as Shari’a) law in order to assess whether Takaful
could be considered a possible means of legal transfer1 under English common law. Toward this goal,
the paper, inter alia, explores the concept of legal uncertainty in English common law, a legal system
predominantly based on precedent, and the concept of uncertainty (Gharar) in Shari’a law, a legal system
derived from the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Some argue that, due to the mix of similarities and differences, reconciling the law on uncertainty is
fraught with issues within both Shari’a law and English common law. Others theorise, using more critical
analysis, that comparing the bases on which Shari’a law and English common law find value will lead to a
greater understanding of the two legal systems and identification of their compatible aspects, leading to a
more harmonious and mutually beneficial relationship. To this latter end, the philosophical, or better, the
ontological meaning of uncertainty can best be understood if the concept is construed on a broader scale
than its legal interpretations and effects. In this light, while legal interpretations might differ, an ontological
approach to uncertainty may lead to a new way of thinking. Therefore, this article will consider the
concept of uncertainty from both the legal and ontological perspectives.
In the insurance market and under insurance contracts, the concepts of uncertainty, legal uncertainty,
and risk are dealt with differently: through risk-taking, under English common law, and risk-sharing, under
Shari’a law. The differences reflect not only a word game, but also different legal views of insurable risk
and uncertainty as between commercial and non-commercial insurance under the two legal traditions. This
paper identifies the concept of “measurable uncertainty” – in accordance with Professor Frank Knight’s
seminal book2 – as the only insurable risk. That concept also serves as the common element whose
mutual understanding can form the basis for common ground in the regulation of the insurance market as
between English common law and Shari’a law.
To this end, the first part of the article, in section 2 and sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2, looks at the concept
of (legal) uncertainty under, respectively, English common law and Shari’a law. Section 2.3 then explains
the ontological meanings of risk and uncertainty in order to highlight similarities between English common
law and Shari’a law. Having provided the legal and theoretical backgrounds of key concepts related to the
insurance market, sections 3 and 4 then illustrate Takaful (i.e., Islamic insurance) as an instance of risk-
sharing by pointing out both the benefits of a possible implementation in the UK and the hurdles to
implementation. The article’s content and arguments are summarized in the last part of the paper.
2. English Common Law: The concept of (legal) uncertainty
According to Husa,3 the English legal system is predominantly based on a common law approach and
remains consciously tied to its historical origins despite social and economic changes. There has been
resistance to major changes, even though various aspects of the legal system have come under
1ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993).
2See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (3d ed. 2002).
3JAAKKO HUSA, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 211 (2015).
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investigation from committees and critics alike.4 This resistance raises questions as to how much the
English legal system is open to influence from other legal systems of the world.
In the area of financial risk, however, recent years have shown some openness to change. One
example is the Financial Services Bill. In December 2013, it passed into law as the Financial Services
(Banking Reform) Act 2013 (UK). Arising from the concern about the massive financial frauds that the
global financial crisis revealed, this legislation placed restrictions on high-risk investment-banking
businesses. It also confirmed that senior managers could be liable to criminal prosecution for reckless
misconduct, although one of the principal causes of the crisis has been identified as corporate governance
failures.5 For this reason, the Act gave regulatory authorities greater powers to identify and address
systemic risks as they emerge and provided for greater choice to consumers.
The adoption of the 2013 Act demonstrates that, without doubt, the laws that govern commercial and
financial matters are of extreme importance for the UK, and that Parliament is willing to accommodate and
accept changes to ensure stability of financial markets so that they remain economically competitive and
offer greater choice.
Another indication of financial concern had happened even earlier, with regard to addressing legal
uncertainty. The Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC) was established in 2002 in the UK as a means
of identifying issues of legal uncertainty or misunderstanding in financial markets, and of considering how
such issues should be addressed. This Committee was also charged with liaising with the judiciary to help
judges and courts remain up to date on developments in financial market practices.6 The establishment of
the FMLC is important for strengthening the monitoring of financial markets as well as for acting on
matters where issues are caused by legal uncertainty in the financial industry. But it should be highlighted
that some aspects of legal uncertainty are inevitable in contemporary financial markets, which are by
nature international and competitive.7
A significant matter of debate that remains, however, is whether uncertainty in the common law, and
specifically for commercial law, is a risk or an opportunity.8 With regard to legal uncertainty, there are two
forms that are relevant in commercial law. The first is when some doubt remains unresolved over a
substantial period of time. The second, although rare, occurs when a settled view of the law is changed by
a court. Legal risk differs from legal uncertainty in that legal risk specifically focuses on the chances of
being sued, being the subject of a claim in some other way, or suffering a loss due to a technical defect
in a transaction.9
Legal uncertainty can be linked with informed decision-making. In defining situations where uncertainty
may arise, Professor Iain MacNeil uses three categories: first, when there is inappropriate use of language;
second, when a word or words are used in a way that is inconsistent with the understanding of the
4MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 146-54 (1991).
5Roman Tomasic, The financial crisis and the haphazard pursuit of financial crime, 18 J. FIN. CRIME 7, 13 (2011).
6ROGER MCCORMICK, LEGAL RISK IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 441 (2d ed. 2010).
7See generally THOMAS COTTIER, JOHN H. JACKSON, & ROSA LASTRA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FINANCIAL REGULATION AND MONETARY
AFFAIRS (2012); JOHN RAYMOND LABROSSE, RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL, & DALVINDER SINGH, MANAGING RISK IN THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM (2011); RAVI C. TENNEKOON, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1991).
8See, e.g., Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Uncertainty: Risk or Opportunity, Notes
from the first meeting of the Blue Chip Finance Leaders Programme (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.icaew.com/-/media/
corporate/files/qualifications-and-programmes/leadership-development/blue-chip-finance-leaders/uncertainty-risk-or-
opportunity.ashx.
9Iain MacNeil, Uncertainty in Commercial Law, 13 EDINBURGH L. REV. 68, 70 (2009).
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contracting parties; and third, when there is unsettled usage in that there is no relevant agreement in
the relevant community on the meaning of the word or words. When parties engage in commercial
transactions, recognizing areas of legal uncertainty is part of an informed decision-making process, which
in turn leads, ideally, to an efficient market.10 In other words, the contractual parties generally know the
limits beyond which legal uncertainty can emerge, and they agree to contractual terms in order to avoid or
at least mitigate that uncertainty. Should the parties go beyond those limits, they then may take on the
legal risk of a possible claim or a loss.
Under English commercial law—as opposed to Shari’a law—risk-taking is not generally considered a
negative strategy.11 Overall, English markets, as well as Western financial markets generally, are dominated
by the idea of risk-taking in order to make a profit: the higher the risk, the higher the returns. The reliance
on risk-taking necessitates a tricky balancing act in Western countries because, while contractual parties
who go beyond legal uncertainty might be exposed to legal risk, nonetheless without a risk-taking
approach there is no possibility of making profit. Specifically within the English insurance industry, the
importance of risk-taking represents the crucial feature that allows the insurer to bear the possible risks
that are incurred by the insured: risk-taking demands an available outlet for risk transfer.12
Furthermore, recognising that there are circumstances where uncertainty offers benefit to contracting
parties—an opportunity—it has been suggested that legal uncertainty can best be reduced to the
appropriate degree through contract terms that allocate or transfer risk arising from legal uncertainty and
that use “clearance decisions,” guidance, and legal opinions to resolve matters.13 In other words, the
commercial contract becomes a means through which the parties can govern uncertainty in a transaction
and manage risk. It can even be said that, under English common law, the commercial contract becomes
a risk-trading tool.
These concepts will be further explained below when the categories of risk and uncertainty are used as
interpretation tools in order to underline similarities between English common law and Shari’a law.
2.1 (Legal) uncertainty under Shari’a law
Muslim scholars agree that the Qur’an and the Sunnah form the primary sources of Shari’a law,14 with its
objective and purpose being the governing of all aspects of the private and public lives of Muslims.
It functions as an all-embracing narrative of Islam as both a religion and a civilisation,15 and it
encompasses a range of rules, regulations, teachings, and values. Shari’a law, like English common law,
is not always straightforward, and must be interpreted by the judiciary. Such interpretation is particularly
challenging when the social context changes. Further, unlike with English common law, decisions are
made on a case-by-case basis with no judicial precedent. The decision of a court or a judicial committee
10Id. at 69.
11Please refer further to the concept of risk-sharing under Shari’a law discussed in paragraph 2.1, infra.
12In this light, legal uncertainty is translated into the general concept of risk, the latter interpreted as a form of
measurable uncertainty in accordance with the understanding of Professor Frank Knight. It is, therefore, considered a
negotiable object that can be transferred between contractual parties.
13MacNeil, supra note 9, at 69-99.
14See HANS VISSER, ISLAMIC FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 12 (2d ed. 2014); WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC
LAW 16 (2009); BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 15 (1998).
15Nima Mersadi Tabari, Islamic finance and the modern world: the legal principles governing Islamic finance in
international trade, 31 The COMPANY LAWYER 249, 249 (2010).
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has no binding authority with respect to another case.16 Therefore, the Muslim judge needs to be suitably
qualified to apply interpretation deemed to be appropriate within a given situation and ensure its
consistency with Shari’a law.17
The aspect of the law dealing with transactional matters, known as Muamalat, governs individuals’
interactions, including those concerning their financial and commercial affairs.18 Two key elements
distinguish Muamalat: first, that individuals are always reminded that they need to obey God in their quest
for their daily material needs,19 and second, that by acting upon the rules of Muamalat in daily life, a
greater bond is created with God.20
According to Dr. Patrick Sookhdeo, Islamic finance is not that relevant to the essential practices of
Shari’a law. More controversially, he has stated that applying Shari’a law in finance is neither Islamic nor
efficient.21 Others have argued, more persuasively, that Islamic finance is, in fact, an integral part of
Shari’a law. Although it does not address finance in its modern form, Shari’a law does incorporate general
principles governing the economic behaviour of Islamic society and specific instruments regulating classic
commercial transactions.22 Indeed, throughout history, Islamic banking has gone through different phases
of development with time required to transfer Islamic banking principles from the theoretical to the
practical domain.23
Facilitated to a large extent by the export of oil from Muslim states, Islamic finance and banking have
seen a huge growth in recent years.24 As a result, Western institutions and governments have been keen
to ensure they are part of the economic growth, and so have introduced Islamic finance and banking into
their systems.25 This phenomenon has perhaps been a contributing factor in bringing Shari’a law and
Islamic finance to the forefront of comparative study, discussion, and viable applicability.
Islamic scholars have found general rules governing economic activities in the Qur’an and within the
Sunnah, and on that basis a doctrine of fairness in commercial dealings has been established. There are
four components in this doctrine, namely, prohibition of Riba (usury),26 Gharar (uncertainty), and Qimar
(gambling), as well as the encouragement of Taa’won (mutual co-operation).27
Gharar, literally translated, means uncertainty, hazard, chance, or risk,28 although there are a number
of interpretations of what Gharar means in practice. Indeed, it can refer to a lack of knowledge itself or to
16HALLAQ, supra note 14, at 19.
17WEISS, supra note 14, at 8.
18BRIAN KETTELL, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE 15 (2011); MUNAWAR IQBAL & DAVID T. LLEWELLYN, ISLAMIC
BANKING AND FINANCE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PROFIT SHARING AND RISK 95 (2002). For a good resource for understanding
Muamalat as a concept, see NURADLI RIDZWAN SHAH MOHD DALI, INTRODUCTION TO MUAMALAT (2008).
19Edwina Pio, et al., Pipeline to the Future: Seeking Wisdom in Indigenous, Eastern, and Western Traditions, in
HANDBOOK OF FAITH AND SPIRITUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 207 (Judi Neal ed., 2013).
20Abdul Karim Aldohni, The quest for a better legal and regulatory framework for Islamic banking, 17 ECCLESIASTICAL L. J.
15, 16 (2015).
21PATRICK SOOKHDEO, UNDERSTANDING SHARI’A FINANCE: THE MUSLIM CHALLENGES TO WESTERN ECONOMICS 23 (2008).
22Aldohni, supra note 20, at 249.
23SOOKHDEO, supra note 21, at 15.
24Qudeer Latif, Introduction to Islamic Finance, CLIFFORD CHANCE LAW FIRM WEBSITE (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.
cliffordchance.com/briefings/2013/04/introduction_to_islamicfinance.html.
25Aldohni, supra note 20, at 7-8; VISSER, supra note 14, at 12-26.
26Mohsin Khan & Abbas Mirakhor, Islam and the economic system, 2 REV. ISLAMIC ECON. 1, 1 (1992).
27SOOKHDEO, supra note 21, at 249.
28Indeed, according to the Financial Times Lexicon Gharar means “risk, uncertainty or hazard.” http://lexicon.ft.com/
term?term¼gharar. In particular, the Arabic word for Gharar is ررغ , which means risk in its etymology. See Salman Bin
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a contracting party’s lack of knowledge.29 However, this broad interpretation needs to be defined and
narrowed. In particular, the concept of Gharar is connected both to the concept of legal uncertainty and to
uncertainty itself in economic terms.30 In this meaning, the concept of Gharar is linked to the concept of
risk. It is, as it will be further explained, a pure form of risk, in accordance with the thesis of Professor
Knight that defines uncertainty, as opposed to risk, as an unmeasurable form of hazard.31 With the moral
aim of ensuring that contracting parties are clear on what they are agreeing to and understand their rights
and obligations, Gharar is not permissible when there is an unknown outcome in an exchange. Indeed, it
has been noted that contracts are forbidden under conditions of excessive uncertainty and unacceptable
levels of risk.32 In this context, it is important to clarify that Shari’a law, in reference to Gharar, usually
does not go beyond the contract to ascertain what is in the minds of contracting parties. This means,
Footnote continued
Lambak, Shariah Juristical effect of Gharar in predetermining Takaful contribution, 1 INT’L J. EDUC. & RES. 1, 1 (2013).
Although there is no verse in the Holy Qur’an that proscribes Gharar, vanity is forbidden in two Islamic verses that are
usually connected to the prohibition of Gharar. The first one is under the Holy Qur’an, Surah 2, verse 188:
,, َوَلاَتْأُكُلوْاأَْمَوالَُكمَبْيَنُكمِباْلَباِطِلَوُتْدُلوْاِبَهاِإلَىاْلُحٰكاِمِلَتْأُكُلوْاَفِريًقامْنأَْمَواِلالٰناِسِباِلإْثِمَوأَنُتْمَتْعَلُموَن .. . Verse 188
has been translated by the Islamic scholars Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali, and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan
as follows: ,, And eat up not one another’s property unjustly (in any illegal way e.g. stealing, robbing, deceiving,
etc.), nor give bribery to the rulers (judges before presenting your cases) that you may knowingly eat up a part of
the property of others sinfully .. .Translation of the meanings of the Noble Qur’an in the English language, 39.
Furthermore, the other verse of the Holy Qur’an that concerns Gharar is the Surah 4, verse 29:
,, َياأَّيَهااٰلِذيَنآَمُنواَلاَتْأُكُلواأَْمَوالَُكمَبْيَنُكمِباْلَباِطِلِإٰلاأَنَتُكوَنِتَجاَرًةَعنَتَراٍضمنُكْمَوَلاَتْقُتُلواأَنُفَسُكْمِإٰنالٰلَهَكاَن
ِبُكْمَرِحيًما .. Verse 29 has been translated always by the same Islamic scholars Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-
Hilali, and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan as follows: ,, O you believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves
unjustly except it be a trade amongst you, by mutual consent. And do not kill yourselves (nor kill one another).
Surely, Allah is Most Merciful to you .. . Translation of the meanings of the Noble Qur’an in the English
language, 112. For an interpretation of these verses in terms of Gharar prohibitions, see Abdul-Rahim Al-Saati, The
Permissible Gharar (Risk) in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence, 16 J. KING ABDUL AZIZ U.: ISLAMIC ECON. 3, 7 (2003).
Finally, on the possible definitions of Gharar, see also MOHAMMAD AL-AMEEN SIDDIQ AL-DHAREER, AL-GHARAR IN
CONTRACTS AND ITS EFFECTS ON CONTEMPORARY TRANSACTIONS 10 (Eminent Scholars Lecture Series 1997). Indeed, Al-
Dhareer divides Gharar in jurisprudential terms in three main definitions:
[F]irst, Gharar applies exclusively to cases of doubtfulness or uncertainty as in the case of not knowing
whether something will take place or not. This excludes the unknown. The definition by Ibn Abidin is a case
in point: “Gharar is uncertainty over the existence of the subject matter of sale”; second, Gharar applies only
to the unknown, to the exclusion of the doubtful. This view is adopted by the Zahiri school alone. Thus
according to Ibn Hazm: “Gharar in sales occurs when the purchaser does not know what he has bought and
the seller does not know what he has sold”; third, a combination of the two categories above; Gharar here
covers both the unknown and the doubtful, as exemplified by the definition proposed by Al-Sarakhsy: “Gharar
obtains where consequences are concealed”. This is the view favoured by most jurisprudents. I have opted for
this last definition because of its more exhaustive coverage of the jurisprudential elements collated under
Gharar.
Id. at 10.
29MAHA-HANAAN BALALA, ISLAMIC FINANCE AND LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 29 (2010).
30Al-Saati, supra note 28, at 5.
31KNIGHT, supra note 2, at 233. In particular, the concepts of uncertainty and risk are extremely important
in order to understand the difference between insurable and uninsurable risks. Therefore, because this paper is
focused on a comparative study of Takaful, its recognition and understanding is probably even more important in
order to construct a common legal ground for the implementation of a legal transfer related to Takaful into the UK
legal system.
32Aldohni, supra note 20, at 249.
6 of 17 pages D’Alvia, International Review of Law 2017:10
therefore, that Gharar is not about deception nor, unlike uncertainty in the English common law, is it
about taking a risk in decision-making.33
However, the reality is that with commercial contracts there will always be some element of risk and
uncertainty.34 Some Gharar is, therefore, acceptable as it will not always be possible to eliminate
uncertainty totally from exchange contracts.35 Due to the prohibition of Gharar and, therefore, of risk-
taking, contracting parties look to find risk-sharing solutions36 (for instance, the Takaful that will be further
explained in this paper) instead of risk-trading tools. To this end, the risk of a commercial transaction is
admissible only if all the contracting parties share the same level of acceptable risk inside a transaction.37
Gharar in Islamic finance is not without issues, primarily because there is no universal agreement
among Muslim jurists as to what degree of legal uncertainty is acceptable in commercial transactions.
Gharar is therefore a matter of interpretation, which in itself can cause issues.38 In an attempt to counter
such issues, learned scholars are generally relied upon to distinguish between contracts containing minor
Gharar (allowed) and contracts containing substantial Gharar (forbidden, and therefore, void).39
2.2 Legal uncertainty under English common law and under Shari’a law
There are some significant differences between legal uncertainty in English common law and Islamic
finance. A major difference is that the main principles of Islamic finance are governed by Shari’a law,
which is considered divinely revealed: Muslims must comply with it in order to perform their religious
obligations. In contrast, English common law depends only on an earthly “law giver.”40 The practical
consequence is that some financial tools acceptable under English common law are not acceptable
under Shari’a law.
For example, the prohibition of Gharar in Islamic finance means that a transaction involving what
scholars deem to be an unacceptable level of uncertainty is void. Consequently, derivatives, including
options, forward contracts, and futures, are invalid. Conventional insurance, too, is invalid because the
total amount of the premium to be paid by the policyholder is undeterminable, and this imposes an
unacceptable level of uncertainty on the price of the agreement.41 On the other hand, in the UK,
conventional insurance is not usually deemed invalid. Hence, due to the prohibitions in the doctrine of
fairness in commercial dealings, there is a limit on the financial offerings that an Islamic bank can make
as compared with banks operating under English common law.
Another major difference in the approaches to legal uncertainty is that under English common law,
legal uncertainty can be acceptable even when it is more than just a minor uncertainty; some even argue
33IQBAL & LLEWELLYN, supra note 18, at 32-34.
34Aldohni, supra note 20, at 249.
35M. KABIR HASSAN & MERVYN K. LEWIS, HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 241 (2007).
36Waheed Akhter, Risk Management in Takaful, 2 ENTERPRISE RISK MGMT. 128, 129 (2010).
37Adel Ahmed, Global financial crisis: an Islamic finance perspective, 3 INT’L J. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE EASTERN FIN. & MGMT.
306, 314 (2010).
38BALALA, supra note 29, at 42. See Nehad A. A. Khanfar, A critical analysis of the concept of Gharar in Islamic
Financial Contracts: Different Perspective, 37 J. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 1, 2 (2016).
39BALALA, supra note 29, at 39. In particular, she reported how the concept of Gharar usually distinguishes between
forbidden Gharar and permissible Gharar. Only the forbidden Gharar can render a contract void. That is also the
distinction that Al-Baji, a Maliki scholar, has made between major Gharar (forbidden) and minor Gharar (ineffective) (see
Al-Saati, supra note 28, at 9).
40KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 303-04 (3d ed. 2008).
41SOOKHDEO, supra note 21, at 15.
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that implementing rules designed to promote legal certainty is a strategy that is doomed to failure.42 In
contrast, in Islamic finance a great effort is made to reduce uncertainty as much as possible, and, as
previously noted, what remains must be minor for a transaction to proceed.43
On the other hand, there appears to be some common ground between English common law and
Shari’a law when compared based on the ontological, rather than legal, definition of uncertainty. This
comparison reveals that both legal systems acknowledge and tolerate some level of uncertainty. English
common law fosters a legitimisation of the concept of risk-taking when operating under conditions of
uncertainty,44 while Islamic law does not entirely reject risk when operating under conditions of some
uncertainty. Islamic law does not provide the contracting parties with the risk-trading solutions that English
common law offers, but it does acknowledge the concept of risk-sharing. Thus, it cannot be argued that
uncertainty itself as a pure form of risk is never capable of being shared or simply traded into a contract.
Underlying these approaches to uncertainty, it has also been argued by some that, compared to other
systems, Islamic finance is not that different from Western world finance and is not that different from
English common law and other Western legal systems.45 For example, in both systems, the decision-
making about whether uncertainty is acceptable or renders a contract void has been left to individual
judges to make. Of course, the judiciary under the English common law is restricted by a rule of precedent
not applicable to Muslim judges. However, Muslim judges are also subject to restrictions because they
need to ensure that the Qur’an and Sunnah are followed in their decision-making.
2.3 The concepts of risk and uncertainty: New interpreting tools to compare
English common law and Shari’a law
Despite the different approaches to legal uncertainty of English common law and Shari’a law, uncertainty
itself, as noted above, is a common feature of the two legal systems. Its importance in the insurance
industry, for example, is self-evident. And in both systems, the philosophical concept of uncertainty goes
beyond its apparent definition as “legal.” Indeed, the differentiation of risk from uncertainty and the
categorisation of risk in its ontological meaning are key elements to understanding uncertainty and risk
from a legal point of view.
In this light, the epistemological analysis is enlightening. If there is risk, there must be something
unknown or that will produce an unknown result. Hence, knowledge about risk is knowledge about lack of
knowledge. This hendiadys—knowledge and lack of knowledge—constitutes the focal point of risk analysis.
It demonstrates that, epistemologically, knowledge of risk is the point at which the unknown (uncertainty)
becomes knowable to a certain degree.
Risk, in this new light, becomes the probability of occurrence of an event that may or may not occur.
Viewed in this light, risk is always a measurable uncertainty. According to Prof. Knight:
the practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or
from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true . . . the best
example of uncertainty is in connection with the exercise of judgement or the formation of those
42MacNeil, supra note 9, at 68-99.
43BALALA, supra note 29, at 39.
44See Section 2 of this paper, supra.
45Aldohni, supra note 20, at 56.
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opinions as to the future course of the events, which opinions (and not scientific knowledge)
actually guide most of our conduct.46
So, it is possible to state that knowledge about risk is knowledge about a knowable situation. In other
words, the ontological discourse on risk represents what is knowable in principle or a priori by virtue of
the laws of probability and the science of statistics. It is knowledge of objective facts. On the other hand,
uncertainty is the knowledge of unknowable instances; it is the estimate of estimates. As opposed to an
objective conception of risk, uncertainty is subjective, relative, and a form of “pure” risk. For this reason,
Prof. Knight describes risk as a measurable uncertainty (objective dimension) and uncertainty itself as an
unmeasurable calculation of instances (subjective dimension).
As a result of this analysis, the steps needed to bring the two legal systems together follow logically.
The need to interpret financial acts under English common law and under the main Shari’a sources (i.e.,
the Qur’an and Sunnah) has compelled both systems to acknowledge legal uncertainty and to attempt to
manage it using forms of risk-taking (under the common law) and risk-sharing (under Shari’a law). The
concept of risk management translates, in English common law, into the concept of consistency with
precedent, and, in Shari’a law, into consistency with rules and principles (i.e., Gharar). While the
differences in these laws might appear at first to be insurmountable, once risk is understood as a
measurable uncertainty, the subject matter of insurance contracts between English common law and
Shari’a law can coincide.
This coming-together results because both systems contemplate a certain level of measurement when
determining what is and is not acceptable. The concept of Gharar is that legal uncertainty is permissible
when it is minor; legal uncertainty under English common law, while generally admissible even if it is
more than minor, is not acceptable if the commercial transaction leads to an unfair result.47 Thus, when
the contractual parties are entering into a new transaction they are implicitly referring to a measurable
uncertainty that can be governed through the means of the contract and/or through negotiations. In other
words, they are referring to the conception of risk: a measurable uncertainty that is delimited by legal
uncertainty. Thus, risk is a form of uncertainty that can be negotiated because it can be measured, and in
some instances under the law, it can even be corrected (through, for example, the principle of good faith).
On the other hand, when that same uncertainty is connected with the parties’ intentions or with a
more general concept of desirability or opinions, uncertainty is no longer identifiable and measurable.
In Professor Knight’s words, this is the reign of “pure” risk. This is the ontological existential space of
uncertainty, namely, an unmeasurable instance of risk that cannot be controlled or governed or better
managed. When there is uncertainty in the form of pure risk, there is not any possible risk-trading or risk-
sharing solution to be implemented. It is a pure form of hazard.
Therefore, the ontological meanings of risk and uncertainty provide the reader with a new
interpretation of legal uncertainty that derives from a sound understanding of uncertainty as an
unmeasurable form of risk. Neither the law nor any other means of governance can interfere beyond this
limit because in this space, risk-trading solutions and risk-sharing perspectives cannot be constructed.
Uncertainty simply cannot be implemented or traded into a contract when it is a pure form of risk.
46KNIGHT, supra note 2, at 233.
47Helen Pugh, An implied term of good faith: a watershed or a damp squib?, 28 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 347, 348
(2013).
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The next research question will centre on discovering how risk management, and therefore, means of
governance are structured in law under a Takaful insurance contract and how a common law jurisdiction
like the UK can accommodate the Shari’a construction of risk beyond its legal qualification.
3. Takaful as an instance of risk sharing under Shari’a law
In the Islamic world a considerable portion of the people and businesses are reluctant to use conventional
insurance because a majority of Islamic jurists and scholars believe that it is not permissible under Shari’a
law.48 Concerns about conventional insurance come first from the prohibition of Riba (interest), because
excess premiums retained by insurers as profits are regarded as a form of prohibited excess; second, from
the prohibition of Gharar (uncertainty), because amounts payable under insurance contracts depend on
future events, which renders the outcome of the contract materially uncertain; and third, from the
prohibition of Maisir (gambling), because these contracts are seen as speculative.49 This reluctance to rely
on conventional insurance models has also increased in the last fifty to sixty years because of the growing
political independence of many Muslim countries and their willingness to revive Shari’a law in place of
secular legislation.50
In this situation, Islamic scholars have endorsed the concept of Takaful as a permissible arrangement
for the sharing of risk.51 Consequently, Takaful insurance products are emerging as a central part of a
Shari’a law-compliant area of financial services, helping to meet insurance needs in ways that are
consistent with Muslim beliefs.52
Takaful53 is, in principle, a charitable construct through which participants aim to help others who have
suffered misfortune in the spirit of cooperation,54 mutual benefit, and social protection.55 In support of this
approach, in its session held in Riyadh in November 2013, the Council of the International Islamic Fiqh
Academy (IIFA) adopted a resolution on cooperative insurance.56 According to the resolution, commercial
insurance is different and separate from non-commercial insurance because the latter does not aim to
achieve profit, but instead, to promote cooperation in the bearing of risk. It is a concept of risk-sharing
where the risk is not transferred to the insurer. Therefore, Gharar is avoided. Indeed, the form adopted by
Takaful providers is somewhat similar to that of a co-operative insurance organisation, but it complies with
48Antony Hainsworth, Retakaful, regulation and risk: Developing the Islamic insurance market in the UK – Conventional
reinsurance will give way to retakaful facilities, 24 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 193, 195 (2009).
49Id. at 202.
50For a non-exhaustive overview of this topic, see generally ANTONY BLACK, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM THE PROPHET
TO THE PRESENT (2001); Tamir Moustafa, Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in
Contemporary Egypt, 32 INTL J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 3 (2000); BASSAM TIBI, THE CHALLENGE OF FUNDAMENTALISM: POLITICAL ISLAM
AND THE NEW WORLD DISORDER (1998); ABDEL SALAM SIDAHMED & ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAMI, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM (1996).
51Zuriah Abdul Rahman, Takaful: Potential Demand and Growth, 22 J. KING ABDULAZIZ U., ISLAMIC ECON. 171, 177 (2009).
52GÖNÜLAL O. SERAP, TAKAFUL AND MUTUAL INSURANCE: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MANAGING RISKS 16 (2013).
53The word Takaful in Arabic is التكافل (from the Arabic verb Kafala) which, according to the Malaysian Takaful
Association, means to take care of one’s need. Malaysian Takaful Association, Takaful Definitions http://www.malaysi
antakaful.com.my/About-MTA/Takaful-Definitions.aspx.
54Ramin Cooper Maysami & W. Jean Kwon, An analysis of Islamic Takaful insurance: A cooperative insurance
mechanism, 18 J. INS. REG. 109, 115 (1999). A later analysis can be found in W. Jean Kwon, Islamic Principle and Takaful
Insurance: Re-evaluation, 26 J. INS. REG. 53 (2007).
55KEVIN LAZARUS & JULIAN BURLING, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 533 (2011).
56Council of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA), of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Resolution
No. 200 (6/10) of OIC Fiqh Academy: Bases of Cooperative Insurance In the light of Shari’a Rulings and Controls, 24
ISLAMIC ECON. STUD. 117 (2016).
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Shari’a law requirements by addressing and resolving the objections against conventional insurance.
Under conventional insurance the insurance company accepts the financial burden of others’ losses.
In other words, the conventional insurance company is taking risk and is seeking profit by virtue of the
premium that represents the price for the bearing of the insurer’s risk.57 In contrast, in a Takaful
arrangement, the participants contribute a sum of money as a Tabarru (donation) into a common pool
that is used to mutually assist the members against other areas of Islamic finance.
The Takaful structure adopted will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, largely based on the school of
thought of the legal jurists prevalent in the country. The most frequent structures adopted are based on
either Mudaraba58 or Wakala59 models. In each case the funds from the Takaful participants are pooled.
These pooled funds are then invested by the Takaful operators, typically in a balance of cash, short-term
maturity investments, and longer-term maturity investments to ensure that the pool of funds is available to
pay any claims as they arise. Additionally, Takaful operators will usually enter into a Qard Hassan
(a compliant, interest-free loan) to meet any temporary liquidity shortfalls in the pool.60
The principal difference between the Mudaraba and Wakala models is the manner in which the Takaful
operators are remunerated. Under a Mudaraba structure,61 the Takaful operator is appointed as an
investor of capital on behalf of the Takaful participants. The operator is entitled to a share of the profits of
the venture (i.e., the excess contributions once claims have been paid) in return for the operator’s
expertise in managing the investments and underwriting operations. In contrast, under a Wakala
structure,62 the Takaful operator is paid a fee for managing the Takaful investments and underwriting
operations, and the risk of the surplus being depleted is borne primarily by the participants. However, the
operator’s remuneration may (depending upon the terms of the contract) include a performance fee,
charged against any fund. In everyday practice it is common for Takaful structures to include both
Mudaraba and Wakala elements, usually with the underwriting aspects of the business being subject to a
Mudaraba arrangement, and the investment responsibilities of the Takaful operator regarding the Takaful
pool being subject to a Wakala arrangement.63
57Under conventional insurance the risk is shifted from the insured to the insurer. This understanding of conventional
insurance in the UK is confirmed by recently-enacted legislation concerning the insurance market (Insurance Act 2015
(UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/4/contents, current as of 14 February, 2017). According to Section 3 of the
Insurance Act, the insured has a duty of fair representation of the risk to the insurer. Id.
58See generally Hussain Gulzar Rammal, Mudaraba in Islamic Finance: Principles and Application, 16 BUS.
J. ENTREPRENEURS 105 (2003); Zubair Hasan, Mudaraba as a mode of finance in Islamic banking: theory, practice and
problems, 14 J. MIDDLE EAST BUS. & ECON. 41 (2002).
59Wakala is a traditional Islamic contract that is equivalent to agency in UK. For more information on this area, see
Jonathan Ercanbrack, Regulating Islamic financial institutions in the UK, in ISLAMIC FINANCE IN EUROPE 157 (Valentino
Cattelan ed., 2013).
60Hainsworth, supra note 53, at 193.
61FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 138 (1998). For a historical
perspective on the origin of Mudaraba, see Murat Cizakca, A COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS: THE ISLAMIC
WORLD AND EUROPE, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE OTTOMAN ARCHIVES 4 (1996).
62Murat Cizakca, Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution and the Future 200 (Studies in Islamic Finance,
Accounting and Governance 2011). In particular, evidence suggests that modern Takaful is based mainly on this model
rather than the Mudaraba that was used more when the development of Takaful was starting in the 1980s.
63Hainsworth, supra note 53, at 193.
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It is crucial that all activities of the Takaful operation comply with Shari’a rules and principles. The
main objective in this respect is to avoid Haram64 (prohibited) areas for underwriting and investments.
The importance of Shari’a law compliance is the essence of Islamic financial services; therefore, Takaful
companies must employ a mechanism to ensure that all their transactions (e.g., underwriting, claims, and
investments) are Shari’a law-compliant.
Within the Takaful operation the role of overseeing this compliance with Shari’a principles is
undertaken by a Shari’a Supervisory Board (SSB).65 The SSB is made up of an odd number of members
(usually three or five), all of whom must be qualified jurists in Fiqh al-Muamalat (Islamic transactions
jurisprudence) and have a suitable background and experience in insurance operations and concepts. The
aim of the SSB is to support and advise Takaful companies to conduct their activities in compliance with
Shari’a law principles. This includes reviewing contracts, clauses, and reinsurance treaties; reviewing
investment transactions; answering questions from the board and employees relating to Shari’a law issues;
and reviewing new fatwas (legal opinions) concerning insurance. The role of the SSB is not within day-to-
day operations and transactions; the technical details in terms of underwriting and investment must be
conducted by those with sufficient knowledge. Products that comply with Shari’a law principles earn the
Islamic label, which is essential for uptake by Muslim consumers.
4. Takaful in the UK: perspectives and drawbacks
In 2013 the UK government launched an Islamic Finance Task Force with the objective of promoting the UK
as an investment destination and to raise the profile of Islamic finance in the UK.66 The increased viability
of the UK as a market led to it becoming the first country outside the Islamic world to issue a sovereign
Islamic bond, called a Sukuk, with over USD 34 billion being raised through 49 issues to date.67 The UK is
thus emerging as a suitable market for Islamic finance, but, despite its potential to bring significant
benefits, the concept of Takaful remains largely in its infancy.68 Increased Takaful utilisation in the UK
64The five main Haram areas can be summarised as follows: alcohol and drugs, including alcohol manufacturers, the
transportation thereof and shops selling alcohol; prostitution, while legal in some countries this is strongly condemned in
Islam; Haram items such as pork and pigs, pornography, gambling, and sculptures (as to not encourage idolism); and
finally, any transactions involving Riba (interest), Gharar (uncertainty), and Maisir (gambling).
65Samy Nathan Garas, The control of the Shari’a Supervisory Board in the Islamic financial institutions, 5 INT’L J. ISLAMIC
& MIDDLE EASTERN FIN. & MGMT. 8 (2012).
66Foreign & Commonwealth Office, et al., Government launches first Islamic Finance Task Force, GOV.UK (March 13,
2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-first-islamic-finance-task-force.
67Foreign & Commonwealth Office, et al., Britain set to become first western nation to issue a sovereign Islamic bond,
GOV.UK (June 12, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-set-to-become-first-western-nation-to-issue-a-
sovereign-islamic-bond.
68The largest growth in Takaful insurance is happening mainly in Muslim-dominated countries. This could be explained
by a number of factors. First, the growing wealth in majority-Muslim countries has led to an increase in insurable assets
and activities in the region. Second, some countries are showing a commitment to robust insurance regulation and the
introduction of types of compulsory insurance, such as motor and medical, which is entrenching risk and insurance
concepts in to the minds of the local population. Finally, the development of Takaful as an alternative to regular
insurance is giving a boost to the appetite for insurance among parts of the community who may have avoided
conventional insurance in the past. By 2017, gross global Takaful contributions are estimated to reach over USD 20
billion. See Finance Forward, World Takaful Report 2016: Connecting the dots, forging the future, 6 http://www.
takafulprimer.com/main/downloads/ms_5860.pdf. The growth is driven largely by the wider prospects of the Islamic
banking sector in predominantly Muslim countries. Having said that, Takaful is serving as a viable alternative to
conventional insurance, with countries like Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, UAE, Oman, Indonesia and Turkey all leading the way
for the global development of Takaful products (see EY, Global Takaful Insights 2014: Market updates, growth momentum
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would boost insurance penetration for Muslim consumers. In addition, as a socially conscious insurance
model it can attract non-Muslim consumers seeking ethical financing, stability, and sustainability who
recognise the significance of the emerging Takaful/Retakaful (Islamic reinsurance) market.
However, current approaches to regulating Takaful are problematic. The UK financial services
regulator69 has suggested that it would treat a Takaful provider as it would any other insurance provider,
assuming there was enough similarity in function and form. Further, while Takaful is beginning to grow as
an alternative to conventional insurance outside its major markets of the Middle East and Malaysia, the
lack of consistent regulation risks limiting its future growth.
In particular, current regulatory approaches outside its major markets do not adequately recognize how
Takaful operates. Unlike conventional insurance, Takaful does not involve the transfer of risk. As explained
above, the Takaful fund is owned by its consumers, who jointly take on the insurance risk and share in
any surplus or shortfall. This means that participants are effectively both the insurer and the insured. The
Takaful operators themselves do not own the funds and are more in the position of agent or fund
manager. Yet, although conceptually different from conventional insurance, in many jurisdictions Takaful
operators are regulated in the same way as conventional insurers. This approach may lead to accounting
and reporting issues, which reflect Takaful principles unsuitably while also running the risk of affecting the
long-term viability of the organisation.70
In the UK in particular, Takaful operators are subject to the same regulatory requirements as
conventional insurers because the UK the financial services regulator has not enacted specific rules
adapting the requirements for conventional insurers. The financial services regulator has stated broadly
that it will take a practical approach to its interpretation and supervision of Islamic finance, provided there
is similarity in function and form to conventional financial services or services organisations.71 But
providing Takaful organisations with the same legislative framework as the one designed for conventional
insurers might hinder the development of the market when the new organisations have to address such
issues as the requisite levels of solvency and liquidity, as well as accountancy and reporting requirements
for the businesses. For the UK Takaful industry to achieve critical mass, the UK regulator needs to develop
more specific reporting procedures and corporate governance standards that are suited for Takaful
operators. This further development will help to improve the efficiency and transparency of the industry,
along with providing much-needed regulatory support for the future growth of the industry.72
The implementation of a Takaful market in the UK could be an especially attractive type of commercial
insurance due to the profit-sharing to which the Takaful operators can be entitled once insurance claims
have been paid off. Nonetheless, management of the pooled funds by Takaful operators requires a high
level of expertise in relation to short-term as well as long-term investments. This feature could lead to a
possible information asymmetry on the side of the participants (i.e., principals) who cannot directly control
Footnote continued
continues, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Global_Takaful_Insights_2014/$FILE/EY-global-takaful-insights-
2014.pdf).
69In the UK, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority regulate financial institutions,
including Islamic financial institutions. The greatest part of statutory regulation in the UK financial services sector relates
to consumer protection to ensure that consumers can be confident in their dealings with financial institutions.
70SERAP, supra note 57, at 537-538.
71Hainsworth, supra note 53, at 193.
72SERAP, supra note 57, at 537-38.
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the investment decisions of the Takaful operators (i.e., agents). Therefore, a moral hazard issue can
emerge if Takaful is implemented in Western countries because of the potential for Takaful operators
engaging in risky investments to maximise their own profit over the interests of the participants to the
pool. This could irremediably undermine the spirit of mutual cooperation of Takaful insurance.73 To this
end, it would be a reasonable and cautious choice of English common law to regulate Takaful operators
on the adopted model of conventional insurers by imposing, inter alia, reporting requirements on the
business. This feature – in particular – can effectively prevent information asymmetry and protect
investors from misleading conduct of management.
4.1 The hurdles to implementing a Takaful market in the UK
One of the issues facing the Takaful market in the UK is a lack of suitable reinsurance capacity. Takaful
operators need to ensure that their organisations are run in accordance with the requirements of the
jurisdiction. This includes the management of claim risk and liquidity. These risks in particular raise
challenges in Islamic Takaful markets as well as international Takaful markets such as London’s since
efficient risk-spreading amongst participants is dependent on there being enough Takaful and Retakaful
pools to acquire critical mass. The global Retakaful market is still in its infancy, and many Takaful
operators have had to resort to conventional reinsurance in order to manage their claims and liquidity
levels in line with regulatory obligations. However, conventional reinsurance confronts the same
prohibitions on Gharar and Riba as conventional insurance.
For these reasons, in order to obtain conventional reinsurance, Takaful operators must obtain special
dispensation from their SSBs, relying on the principle of Darura (necessity). As global Takaful/Retakaful
markets grow, it is inevitable that SSBs will be less approving of the use of conventional reinsurance on
the grounds of necessity.74 Furthermore, being unable to obtain suitable reinsurance may suggest to some
Muslim customers that the business is less authentic and not in compliance with true Shari’a law
principles.
While the lack of Retakaful capacity is certainly a risk to all Takaful operators, it also poses an
opportunity for the City of London. If UK Takaful operators were to promote themselves as open for
wholesale operators who are struggling to find suitable reinsurance locally, it would increase the visibility
of the UK as a global Takaful market.
While external factors may hinder the development of the UK market, some of the major risks to the
success of the Takaful industry come from within the organisations themselves, chiefly the SSBs. One
challenge in particular relates to the skills and qualifications of SSB members. The SSB takes responsibility
for vetting products on behalf of consumers; therefore, the quality of their judgement and their ability to
73
In particular, in terms of short-term market expansion, some UK companies may achieve success through the use of a
Takaful window. In one type of such an arrangement, a conventional insurance provider will offer Takaful products
through the same entity that offers conventional insurance, but on the understanding that Takaful funds are segregated
from those of the conventional insurance funds held on the books. It can be argued that the use of Takaful windows
undermines the sincerity of the intention which is necessary for Takaful to ensure its Shari’a law compliance since
transactions are essentially operated together with the non-Shari’a pooled funds. This concern has also lead to the view
that the expansion of the Takaful market in places like the UK is a marketing construct to sell insurance to Muslims and
has little to do with religious or social objectives.
74
Hainsworth, supra note 53, at 193.
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comport their decisions with Shari’a law is vital.75 However, finding scholars that are knowledgeable both
in Shari’a finance law and in financial and accounting practices is difficult. Furthermore, there is no formal
accreditation available to provide the UK regulator with the confidence that Shari’a scholars have the
requisite abilities to fulfil their auditing and advisory roles. A lack of standardisation and consistency in
Shari’a legal opinions across Islamic financial institutions has the ability to undermine confidence in the
industry and hinder its growth.76
A further potential issue arising from the operation of the SSB may appear when it determines that an
organisation has breached Shari’a rules. This declaration may affect consumers’ confidence in the
organisation. This also has the effect of turning compromised assets into liabilities that need to be
offloaded, potentially calling in to question the solvency of the organisation. At present the UK financial
services regulator largely ignores these risks as they are seen as unquantifiable.77
Presently in the UK, SSB members are usually appointed and suspended directly by company directors;
therefore, they are effectively dependent on the firm’s management for their continued employment. SSB
members can, therefore, be said to have an economic stake in the firm and cannot be said to carry out
their roles independently. It could be imagined, however, that this risk could potentially be mitigated by
imposing strict ethical standards so that reputations and future career prospects may be hindered should
SSB member services be found contrary to Shari’a law principles.
However beneficial a strict moral constitution might be, though, it does not make up for a lack of
specific corporate governance procedures regulating SSBs in the UK. The UK regulator has acknowledged
the role of SSBs and recognised their potential impact on the solvency of Islamic financial services
organisations. Nevertheless, it has stopped short of creating criteria and procedures to address the
qualitative nature of SSBs. At present the regulator relies on its existing procedures to examine corporate
governance as applied to all financial institutions. To date the regulator has decided that authorised
Islamic financial institutions employ their Shari’a scholars in a strictly advisory role, meaning that their
responsibilities are not to interfere in the management of the firm. Accordingly, the scholars employed by
the organisation do not have to meet the “fit and proper” regulatory criteria applicable to company
directors.
As secular regulators, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA) do not take a role in advising or endorsing the religious aspects or compliance of product offerings;
it is left to the individual institutions to ensure that their products are Shari’a law compliant. Therefore,
it does seem unlikely that any SSB will materially impact the management or direction of the firm in
question. While the industry is in its formative years, this may be the simplest approach to adopt;
however, the UK regulator must appreciate that the role of the SSB is pivotal within a business. The SSB
legitimises the organisation and its role stimulates Muslim consumer demand for Islamic-compliant
financial services.78
Lastly, a further risk to the UK Takaful market may come from its likely consumers. Some Muslims are
not convinced that Islamic financial products have achieved a sufficient standard of Shari’a law
75JONATHAN ERCANBRACK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIC LAW IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 202 (2015) [hereinafter
ERCANBRACK, TRANSFORMATION].
76DAVID M. BOJE, ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBAL STANDARDIZATION: SOLUTIONS TO STANDARDS AND NORMS OVERWHELMING
ORGANIZATIONS 88 (2015).
77ERCANBRACK, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 80, at 200.
78ERCANBRACK, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 80, at 203-206.
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compliance. Ultimately, the issue of trust and confidence in the products available plays a significant role
in the growth of the industry.79 This is also reflected in the price. Consumers will be willing to pay for
quality products in the market. On the other hand, some consumers may respond to poorer quality
products by decreasing their investments or utilising their exit option from the company or the Takaful
market altogether. To this end, it is important that trust, transparency, and disclosure are evident in the
market. Hence, the UK regulator and industry groups should endorse minimum standards or best practices
to ensure that low-quality producers do not saturate the market.
Despite the limited implementation of Takaful in the UK market, the most prolific voice to emerge is
Cobalt Underwriting. The company launched in 2012 as a managing general agent in the Lloyd’s of
London insurance market, exclusively handling Islamic insurance with the capital backing of insurance
companies such as XL, AIG and QBE. Cobalt has achieved a level of success offering a number of different
insurance products, such as property and casualty, and has recently expanded into the financial market.80
However, the Chief Executive Officer has suggested that going in to Takaful insurance might not be as
easy as it seems.81
5. Conclusions
The comparative research carried out in this paper has illustrated that although legal uncertainty is
construed and approached in different ways between the two different legal systems, the concepts of
uncertainty and risk in English common law and Shari’a law can be analysed consistently in the
evaluation, implementation, and promotion of Takaful. Indeed, Takaful implementation in the UK should
not only have positive effects in terms of the national economy, but should also enhance social effects by
offering Muslim consumers products that respect their beliefs. While, as described above, Takaful certainly
confronts risky areas and hurdles potentially limiting its full implementation in the UK market, specific
regulatory support from the PRA/FCA and endorsement from industry groups could give the market the
ability to soar.
In summary, Takaful is a form of cooperative risk management and must be Shari’a law compliant,
unlike conventional insurance in the UK. Takaful consumers effectively act as both the insurer and the
insured. While the legal conception of uncertainty differs between English common law and Shari’a law,
the systems have a common understanding of the fundamental concept of uncertainty. Indeed, uncertainty
plays an important role in structuring the risk management of insurance contracts in both English common
law and Shari’a law. Specifically, while English common law has adopted a concept of risk-taking through
which the contract becomes a risk-trading tool used to deal with uncertainty in commercial transactions,
under Shari’a law the concept of risk-sharing is used to deal with uncertainty in commercial transactions.
The difference in approach is critical because under Shari’a law Gharar cannot be negotiated, only limited.
It has been noted that the conception of uncertainty has mainly centred on its broad identification as
an unmeasurable form of classification of instances. Uncertainty is the “pure” form of risk. But in the world
of commercial transactions, most uncertainty arises as risk that is measurable, and therefore, capable of
79Zulkifli Hasan & Ahmad Fuad, New Takaful Framework under the Malaysian Islamic Financial Services Act, 52 J. INT.L
BANKING & REG. 54 (2015).
80See Cobalt Underwriting Website, http://www.cobaltuw.com.
81C. Parra-Serrano, UK insurance industry primed to target Takaful opportunities, INSURANCE POST, http://www.postonli
ne.co.uk/post/news/2304988/uk-insurance-industry-primed-to-target-takaful-opportunities.
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being limited through negotiation. This measurable “real” risk can therefore legitimately represent the
subject matter of an insurance contract under both Shari’a law and English common law. This common
meaning of uncertainty as measurable risk thus bring together two different legal traditions, and can
constitute the legal ground for the justification of a legal transfer of Takaful into English common law.
In the end, risk is a common feature that is always present in commercial transactions, but uncertainty is
the negative outcome that always has to be avoided through negotiation, or at least limited by means of
prohibitions (i.e., Gharar).
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